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In regions troubled by ethnic based conflict violence often erupts abruptly and severely. Peacemakers, 
then, follow unconditional paths to prevent conflict escalation. The article analyzes the ways in which 
post-conflict constitutional designs shape the state structure through constitutional amendments. 
Peace agreements as bases for constitutional reform, the article claims, have reformatory but 
also obstructive implications. Seeing the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a case study, the paper 
analyzes its implications on the development of the political system in Macedonia. On one side 
OFA serves as a criterion for the Macedonian Euro-Atlantic integration and a driving force for the 
creation of a functioning multicultural society. On the other side, the procedural and substantive 
flaws of the agreement undermine its absorbability in the society. In procedural sense, OFA hindered 
its own implementation through the used terminology and the drafting process. In substantial 
sense, agreement’s goals and provisions reached beyond the purpose of peace agreements and 
underestimated the complexity of the conflicting issues at stake.
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Introduction
In regions historically troubled by civil wars and ethnic based conflict 
violence often erupts abruptly and severely. In such cases, peacemakers 
and politicians often follow unconditional paths to prevent a conflict 
from escalating into a full-fledged war. These various paths towards 
conflict resolution through constitution redesigning have provoked 
scholars and practitioners to devise “best practice” concepts. It has 
become increasingly important for practitioners to draw on synthesized 
conceptual approaches before designing constitutional structures that 
have long-term implications. Moreover, there is a need for future designs 
to build on previous successes and avoid missteps. In a rush for “conflict 
freezing”, as it will be discussed in this article, constitutional arrangements 
contained in peace agreements often underestimate the complexity 
of conflicting issues at stake, both in goal setting, procedural dynamics 
and substantial endurance. When setting the goals, agreements ought to 
realistically target the context. In order for that to be achieved, processes 
of agreement drafting should include a plethora of societal actors in 
order to set an agreed upon base for reforms. Conversely, top-down 
procedures in drafting tend to achieve some, but not all of the goals 
that have been set. In essence, the lack of actors’ participation in the 
procedural dynamics complicates subsequent implementation phase, 
which would lack local ownership.  
Authors have devised the goals that are usually set in post-conflict 
constitution designs by analyzing large data pools of post-conflict 
constitutions and peace agreements. Widner (2008) discusses “three sets 
of ambitions”. The first set entails durability of the agreement, followed 
by the reduction of violence and increase in civility, which allows for 
institutionalization of the conflict. The third ambition underlines the 
importance of agreement’s self-enforcement in the future. Bearing in 
mind that every process varies, there is a wide-spread urge for the design 
drafting to entail sense of inclusion and trust. “Constitution makers must 
find a way to reconcile the need to tie in powerful elites with the demand 
for a consultative process that fosters political dialogue and empowers 
the people” (Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth 2006).
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In unfolding the argument, the article presents the dilemmas of the the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement1, regarding the limits of the constitutional-
institutional engineering. In that sense, we analyze the most prominent 
spheres of influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in the 
Macedonian post-conflict constitutional state structure. The Agreement’s 
widely appreciated as a basis for the creation of a functioning multiethnic 
society, and a criterion for the Macedonian integration in the Euro-
Atlantic institutions. However, while the Agreement should be praised for 
these aspects, its problematic implications should not be underestimated. 
In procedural sense, the Agreement, through its imprecise terminology 
hindered its own implementation. Being a peace agreement, OFA 
determined in detail the processes and provisions of the constitutional 
remaking, not allowing for an inclusive drafting process. In that way, a 
political agreement dominated over the only constitutional body that 
directly represents the citizens in the country. As discussed later, the 
agreement transcended general goals of peace agreements – to bring 
about end to violence and allow for institutionalization of conflict – and 
set forth all-encompassing goals. In substantial sense, the Agreement 
overestimated the ability of the Macedonian society to absorb its goals and 
provisions by introducing the paradigm of the “spirit” of the agreement. 
This has made OFA’s implementation prone to political infringements and 
biased evaluation.
In unfolding the argument, the article describes the socio-political context 
prior to the conflict of 2001. Then, it analyzes the structural remaking 
envisioned in the Ohrid Framework Agreement with the constitutional 
amendments adopted in November, 2001. Subsequently, the article 
describes the implications of the implemented provisions, both in terms 
of process and substance. Finally, the argumentation offers a perspective 
on the possible lessons that can be learned for future post-conflict 
constitutional designs, as well as some thoughts on the development of 
the Macedonian political system. 
1 In the text the terms “the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, “the OFA”, “the Ohrid Agreement” or “the Agreement” are 
used interchangeably.
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Macedonia Leading up to the 2001 Conflict
On 8 September 1991, amidst the socio-political disintegration of Socialist 
Yugoslavia, Macedonian citizens laid the grounds for an independent 
Republic of Macedonia through a popular referendum. On 17 November 
1991, the Assembly adopted a new constitution, which promoted 
Macedonia’s independence, sovereignty and democratic character. 
On the international scene, however, the path towards recognition was 
obstructed, largely because of the problem with neighbors’ unwillingness 
to accept the name of the country2.
For ten years, the international community perceived Macedonia as a 
successful multiethnic model of coexistence. Macedonia was trumpeted 
a conflict prevention example, when compared to the ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, genocides and social destruction in the broader region. Its first 
president, Kiro Gligorov, labelled Macedonia an “oasis of peace”. Being 
that the demographic structure was complex, Macedonia represented a 
multiethnic society at its finest. Ethnic Macedonians comprised 65.3% of 
the population, ethnic Albanians were 21.7%, 3.8% were ethnic Turks, 2.5% 
Romany, ethnic Serbs were 2.1%, and 6% were in other ethnic groups. 
(ICG Balkans Report 2001: 109). However, the claims that the conflict in 
2001 was unexpected, and that the conflicting issues are to be found 
exclusively in that year, are misleading. The complexity of the context, 
which intertwined nations, language, human rights, separatism, historic 
momentum, spillover and Balkan heritage, sadly was to be understood 
only after the conflict.
There are numerous underlying and mobilizing factors that lead to the 
conflict in 2001, but the domestic and foreign actors were not eager to 
act preventively3. Without comprehensively analyzing all the issues that 
drove the conflict, it is important to note the ones that were targeted 
with the Agreement. First, the 1991 Constitution and the political discourse 
were predominantly ethnocentric, which set the terrain for institutional 
2 More on the name issue see Shea ,J,. 1997. Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation. 
Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.
3 On the underlying factors of the conflict and the conflict itself, a comprehensive view can be seen in Phillips, J., 2002. 
Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans. London: I.B. Tauris.
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and structural injustices. The Constitution, while establishing a liberal 
democracy and proclaiming fundamental human rights and freedoms, 
was insufficiently inclusive for the ethnic minorities. That lack of inclusion 
was especially felt in the realm of the use of another language in official 
communication, which was allowed only where other nationalities 
were a large majority strictly on local level. Also, the central position of 
the Macedonians as a constituent people of the country was seen as 
ethnocentric, a notion that was invigorated by the promotion of the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church as a confessional leader of the country. 
As a result, Albanian political parties boycotted the Referendum and the 
constitution adoption. They organized a parallel referendum asking for 
autonomy of Western Macedonia. The ethnic majority, overwhelmed by 
the historic moment of the Macedonian independence, was not alarmed 
by the isolation of the Albanian population. Only in the aftermath of the 
conflict it was understood that the Constitution was embedded with these 
structural injustices, making it a casus belli. 
Second, there was a systemic fault in the structure of state institutions, 
which accentuated the social injustices. The public administration was not 
designed to represent the societal multiethnic conglomerate, especially in 
the use of language, education, and structure. There were issues with the 
participation of Albanians in the school system and their right to mother-
tongue education, with an accent to the universities. The institutional 
representation of Albanians was also problematic when combined with 
the inability to use the Albanian in official institutional communication, 
and the claims for discrimination on ethnic lines. This led to serious country-
wide protests when the government proclaimed the Tetovo Faculty of 
Pedagogy illegal, and violently stopped the peaceful protests in the 
towns of Tetovo and Gostivar. The clashes with the security forces led to 
imprisonment of mayors and other prominent Albanian leaders4. These 
outbursts of violence and the lack of institutional response, further eroded 
the political legitimacy of the state institutions, creating mistrust among 
large portion of the population. 
Third, the spillover effect from the 1999 Kosovo war and the refugee 
crisis emerged as extra-constitutional drivers. Former fighters from the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), unsatisfied with the conclusion of the war 
4 More on the problematic  issues during the transition period in the 1990s can be seen at http://republika.mk/348197 
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on Kosovo, expressed their irredentist and overtly nationalistic territorial 
claims. Their proclaimed goal was the “re-creation of Great Albania” 
(“Ilirida”), which would include the western part of Macedonia, Albania, 
Kosovo and parts of Montenegro5. 
The conflict started in the spring of 2001, when the so called National 
Liberation Army (NLA) occupied small villages in western Macedonia. The 
Albanian rebels at first demanded territorially cleansed Albanian towns 
and villages, and subsequently pivoted towards pledges for human rights 
and freedoms. When in April the NLA killed a number of Macedonian 
soldiers, a severe crisis started unfolding. Macedonian security forces, in 
order to disperse the terrorist groups, countered with heavy artillery in the 
conflicting pockets. Ethnic Macedonians, outraged by NLA’s claims for 
“liberated territories” and the killings, took on innocent ethnic Albanians 
and religious buildings in cities where Macedonians were the dominant 
population6. As the crisis escalated, it was clear that the Macedonian 
authorities are unable to swiftly outgun the NLA. The international 
community unanimously supported the elected government, identifying 
the rebels as “bunch of murderous thugs whose objective is to destroy a 
democratic Macedonia”7. The peak of the escalation happened in June, 
when the NLA captured the village of Arachinovo, only few kilometers 
away from the capital Skopje, the international airport and the NATO 
(KFOR) bases. After a combined actions by the Macedonian police and 
the army, the NLA remained in the village, while their cells throughout 
the country counter-attacked the security forces. This prompted the 
international community to intervene in order to prevent further escalation. 
Javier Solana, then EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, arrived in Skopje in order to expedite a negotiation process 
before the conflict turned into a full-fledged civil war.
5 In a televised interview, one of the activists in KLA and NLA claimed that The Kosovo KLA had other goals, i.e. 
unification of all the territories where the Albanians live. But international officials, according to them, especially the 
Americans, cut it off and prevented them from flying outside the borders of a single state. The analysis can be seen at 
http://bit.ly/2HtkUpS
6 More on the issue can be seen at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/07/world/macedonia-threatens-to-declare-
state-of-war-against-rebels.html
7 Most prominent in his discourse was the NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson. More on the issue can be 
seen at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1317049.stm
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The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA)
The negotiations included a plethora of international actors, who 
created the necessary procedural dynamics needed for the conflict 
resolution. The mediators ,formally facilitators, in the political negotiations 
included James Pardew, a US diplomat, and a representative from the 
EU – Francois Leotard. The facilitation process was assisted by Solana, the 
OSCE representative Robert Frowick, and the Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith. 
While Pardew and Leotard negotiated the issues with the Macedonian 
political actors, Feith and Frowick acted as intermediaries between the 
NLA rebels and the officials. The international community put a strong 
pressure on all parties to find an alternative to the escalating violence. 
NATO, OSCE and EU representatives combined strategies of support and 
shaming and blaming in order to induce the actors to accept the non-
violent alternative of dealing with conflicting issues. 
On 13 August 2001, in Skopje, the Macedonian political representatives 
signed the Agreement, after prolonged and intense negotiations in 
Ohrid. Although a compromise between the two parties of the conflict 
– Macedonian security forces and the National Liberation Army (NLA) - 
OFA’s signatories were the President of the Republic of Macedonia, and 
the leaders of the two predominant parties from the Macedonian and 
the Albanian block. The international community representatives, who 
drafted OFA, acted as witnesses of the signing ceremony.
“The Ohrid Framework Agreement is structured around four areas: 
Securing peace (Articles 1 and 2); Decentralization and use of emblems 
(Articles 3 and 7); Regulations relating to minorities (Articles 4 and 5); and 
Education and use of languages (Article 6)” (Czymmeck and Viciska 
2011: 75). Moreover, it contains three annexes that regulate in detail the 
amendments of the constitution, the needed changes in laws and the 
implementation of the Agreement.
The objectives and the principles of the Agreement were set highly. OFA 
aimed not only to stop the erupting violence, but to secure respect for 
minorities, integration of the country in the European Union and NATO, 
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and democratic development of the country in different spheres. The 
preamble of the Agreement, containing those goals, stated: 
“The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing 
the future of Macedonia’s democracy and permitting the 
development of closer and more integrated relations between 
the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. 
This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious 
development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity 
and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.” (Ohrid Framework 
Agreement 2001: Preamble)
From the Preamble it was clear that OFA’s first aim was to secure 
Macedonia’s existence. Then, the goal was to guarantee and develop 
its democratic future by assisting its integration to the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions and promoting ethnic diversity. Evidently, the goals of the 
peace framework strived for more than peace and prosperity. They 
envisioned to add value to the democratic ambient in the country, 
protect human rights, promote civil society, and drive the international 
integration of the country.  Additionally, using a quid pro quo model, the 
Agreement draw on the demands of the two conflicting parties. Authors 
suggest that “the Ohrid Peace Agreement is a compromise: Macedonia 
is unitary state … but ethnic Albanians are increasing their influence, 
especially on the local level, and have obtained a large right of veto in 
the Parliament” (Maleska 2005). On one side, the Agreement established 
that democratic reforms in the country can only be made by political 
means  On the other one, it stressed the importance of the mechanisms 
for power-sharing and inclusion of minorities as the only path towards a 
functioning democracy – “There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.” 
(Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001: Article 1.2). Based on Macedonian 
demands, the Agreement recognized the territorial unity of the country 
within its borders and its sovereignty. As a counter step, the Albanian side 
gained high degree of autonomy by broadening the rights for local self-
governance and decentralizing state powers. Finally, the Agreement 
stressed the conceptual significance of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of all, established a principle of bi-ethnic consensus on sensitive 
questions, and pledged for substantial foreign aid for full implementation 
of its complex provisions. Essentially, the Agreement generally followed 
Lijphard’s consociational model of democracy, without engaging in 
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federalization and bicameralism – “1. Executive power sharing in broad 
coalition cabinets; 2. Executive-legislative balance of power without 
resignation of the government; 3. Multiparty system (not two-party); 4. 
Proportional representation; 5. Interest-group corporatism; 6. Federal and 
decentralized government. The power is shared between the central 
(federal) government and the federal units in the composition thereof; 7. 
Strong bicameralism; 8. Constitutional rigidity; 9. Judicial control (revision); 
10. Independence of central bank”. (Lijphart 2003: 97-105)
The goals set forth in the preamble of the agreement transcend the pure 
power-sharing model and pledge for cooperation among actors for 
reaching common goals, especially underlining the goals of Euro-Atlantic 
integration and promotion of civil society. That meant that the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement offered a blend between a purely consociational 
and an integrative model. It set consociational features as a basis for the 
new constitutional structures, but also promoted integrative aspects of 
common trans-ethnical goals. However, the goals that were envisioned 
went beyond the aspirations which drafters of peace agreements usually 
set in post-conflict constitutional designs, which focus on the secession 
of violence, transformation of conflict and implementability of a durable 
agreement (Widner 2008). By adding the aspiration for Euro-Atlantic 
integration and the development of civil society as a common goal for 
all the signatories, the Agreement paved the way for a broader reading 
of its purpose in the political system and introduced its intangible “spirit”.
Constitutional amendments
The Macedonian Assembly, by November 2001, passed the demanded 
amendments to the Constitution, drawing on the provisions stated in the 
Annex A of the OFA. The most contested issue was the amendment to the 
Preamble of the constitution, as well as the amendments on the voting 
procedures, the institutional representation of minorities, official use of 
languages, religious organizations, the national heritage, the functioning 
of fundamental institutions, and the provisions that regulate the local self-
government. 
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Amendment 4 of the constitution modified a crucial component of 
the preamble – the concept of national state. The 1991 Constitution 
preamble stated that “…[M]acedonia is established as a national state of 
the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent 
co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, 
Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic of 
Macedonia”. This mono-national formula did not consider more than 30% 
of the population in the country as constituent people. Therefore, based 
on demands from the Albanian signatories, the Agreement entailed the 
civic concept, not specifying an ethnicity. Therefore, Annex A of the 
Agreement begins with: “The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, 
taking over responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland,…” 
This version of the preamble embraced the concept of individual rights. 
However, this approach was in contrast with collective and communities’ 
rights conceptualized as a general rule in the agreement. According 
to some scholars, the Macedonian people and nation disappeared 
as an ethnic category, as well as a sociological one. (Skaric 2004) This 
“citizen approach” was severely criticized by politicians, experts and the 
general public8. After a prolonged debate, an intermediate solution was 
achieved. As such, Amendment 4 contains nation, civic and binational 
state elements, stating:
“The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian 
people, as well as citizens living within its borders who are part 
of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, 
the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosniak people and 
others…”
The promotion of several constituent peoples of the country and 
the primary position for the Macedonian citizens as a majority is a 
democratic achievement worth noting. It stresses the rights of the citizens 
accompanied with the rights of the communities, making the ethnicities 
equally important pillars of the country. However, the list of communities is 
incomplete. The term “others” excludes more than 20 registered minorities, 
which in the subsequent years expressed their grievances of not being 
part of the constituent conglomerate.
8 More on the discussion for the amendments to the Preamble see at http://bit.ly/2I1cxyW
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The second structural transformation is the voting procedure, which 
established a new form of minority veto. Amendment 18, together with 
amendments that regulate the spheres of interest to the communities, 
added an additional obstacle to the absolute majority vote (50% of the 
representatives plus one), and the qualified majority vote (two-thirds of the 
representatives). According to these amendments, “a law that affects the 
communities of the country shall require a two-thirds majority vote [or an 
absolute vote] of the total number of representatives, within which there 
must be a majority of the votes of the total number of representatives 
who belong to the communities not in the majority of the population of 
Macedonia9.” The procedure would affect future amendments to the 
constitution and laws that regulate: local self-government organization; 
the use of language, education, personal documentation, culture and 
use of symbols; the fundamental values of the country; the equality of 
citizens under the law; the freedom of religious confession; the protection 
of identity; the protection of the national heritage; election of Public 
Attorney (Ombudsman), the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations, the 
Security Council of the Republic of Macedonia, the Judicial Council and 
the Constitutional Court judges. The voting procedures amendments 
were to ensure that there could be no “tyranny of the majority” when the 
Assembly decides on questions that are sensitive to the ethnic minorities. 
Some scholars feared that this amendment could turn into a “tyranny of 
the minorities” (Skaric, Siljanovska-Davkova 2009). However, this fear was 
proved unfounded, because the new voting procedure has enabled an 
inclusive debate among representatives on sensitive issues, but has not 
caused major blockades on crucial issues.
The third substantial sphere where the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
brought a change was the use of languages on central and local level. 
According Amendment 5 of the Constitution, the official language of the 
country is Macedonian, which shall be used within the whole territory of 
the country and international correspondence. In addition, any language 
spoken by 20 percent of the population is also an official language 
according to that article of the constitution. The 20 percent threshold, 
a function of demographics and not of symbolic recognition of status, 
meant that Albanian was the only other language which was granted a 
tacit officialization. The use of the second official language was to be in 
9 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia: Amendments 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18.
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spheres of concern for the minorities, such as: issuing personal documents, 
using the language in communication with the public administration, and 
education. The change in this sphere is with regards to the percentage 
and the scope of the usage, decreasing the threshold to 20 percent 
from the former 50 percent. However, the scope of the usage was left for 
interpretation, which nowadays causes disturbances to the Macedonian 
political system. The imprecision in the article allowed the parliamentary 
majority to propose law extending the use of the Albanian language 
in all spheres, making it a second official language in all institutional 
correspondence. This law calls upon the right for a second official 
language given by the Ohrid Framework Agreement and Agreement’s 
importance for the integration to the European Union. As a result, the Law 
is proposed as a law that integrates the Macedonian legal system with the 
one of the European Union10. The opposition coalition and the President, 
in an attempt to block the adoption of the law, put a suspensive veto and 
filed more than 30,000 amendments, stating Law’s unconstitutionality and 
the violation of OFA’s provisions11. This lack of understanding between 
the societal actors demonstrates that the Agreement is prone to various 
political interpretation and shows the conflicting directions in which the 
Agreement can be implemented.
The fourth sphere lies in the concept of equitable representation in all 
public administration agencies, which became part of the fundamental 
Constitutional values. “The purpose the Amendment 6 was to reflect the 
ethnic structure of the population in the central government and the 
public life in general” (Skaric, Siljanovska-Davkova 2009: 176). In paragraph 
4.2. of the OFA it is stipulated that “Laws regulating employment in public 
administration will include measures to assure equitable representation 
of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels of 
employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning 
competence and integrity that govern public administration.” The reform 
allowed for an increased access of disadvantaged communities to public 
administration jobs. However, the implementation of this provision, as 
discussed later in the article, negatively affected the professionalization 
and modernization of the public administration. 
10 The full proposal can be found on http://bit.ly/2r1WEki
11 The President put a veto on the adopted law claiming that it infringed articles of the constitution and had other 
procedural and substantial anomalies. For full review of the veto see http://pretsedatel.mk/mk/2011-06-17-09-55-
07/2011-07-19-10-40-39/4754.html 
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The fifth transformation, which includes Amendments 7 and 9 of the 
Constitution, protects the freedom of religious thought and expression 
of religious beliefs. Amendment 7 begins by setting an equal footing for 
the religious organizations: “The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well 
as the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, 
Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish Community and other Religious 
communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before 
the law”. Furthermore, Amendment 9 obliges the state to “guarantee[s] 
the protection, promotion, and enhancement of the historical and 
artistic heritage of Macedonia and all communities in Macedonia and 
the treasures of which it is composed, regardless of their legal status”. 
These two amendments promote the social inclusion of the different 
communities and religious groups in the country, respecting their diversity 
and historical and cultural heritage. By creating a Committee for Inter-
Community Relations, the Assembly strengthens the focus on intercultural 
dialogue. Committee’s obligation is to recommend solutions to the 
Assembly for inter-ethnic questions.
Finally, Amendments 16 and 17 regulate the voting procedure and 
the scope of functions of the local self-government. These provisions 
represent a basis for the development of a decentralized governing 
system on a local level. The amendments ensured the direct participation 
of the citizens in the functioning of their municipalities, and created an 
opportunity for making relevant decisions by the people concerned.
The complexity of the constitutional amendments and their effects are 
a widely debated topic.12 Scholars have predominantly followed a path 
of unconditional appraisal for the constitutional reform derived from the 
Ohrid Agreement. It is clear that the agreement, which has brought a 
stable peace to Macedonia in the last seventeen years, remains to be 
the base for amicable inter-ethnic communication and social inclusion. 
However, some of the procedural and substantial flaws have not been 
analyzed so far. With a goal to add value to the discussion, the article 
critically observes some of the crucial implications of the agreement for 
the Macedonian political system. The idea is to underline the prospects 
12 See Beiber F. Power Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. (2008) Skopje: Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Risteska M, Daskaloski Z (eds) One Decade after the Ohrid Framework Agreement: Lessons (to be) 
Learned from the Macedonian Experience (2011), Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Center for Research and Policy 
Making. 
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for the implementation of the Agreement in subsequent years, and to 
derive some lessons for similar endeavors.
Implications of the constitutional amendments
The implications of the constitutional amendments are a deeply contested 
issue among the Macedonian and Albanian population and political elites. 
In political discussions, the agreement is seen as a driver for beneficial 
reforms by some of the Albanian political entities, while others stress its 
inability enforce the demanded set of transformations. In the Macedonian 
political sphere the Agreement is seen rather deterministically, from two 
extreme viewpoints. One percentage of the population view it as an 
act of treason, and others have considered OFA a frame for building 
a sustainable multiethnic society with equal treatment for every citizen. 
However, the complexity of the Ohrid Framework Agreement demands 
a detailed and multi-pronged analytical perspective. Therefore, in order 
to draw practical solutions it is essential to understand the formal and 
substantial implications of OFA.
In perspective, the implementation of both Agreement’s articles and 
principles is a crucial criterion for the Macedonian integration in the 
European Union and NATO. According to the European Commission, 
“[t]he Ohrid Framework Agreement remains an essential element for 
democracy and rule of law in the country” (EC Progress Report 2012). 
Therefore, the implementation of the Agreement is the mechanism through 
which Macedonia can adhere to the EU Copenhagen political criteria, 
which require “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities“13. By 
strengthening the minority rights, the society has embraced a dynamic 
approach of building modern multicultural democratic structure. The 
Assembly has undertaken a plethora of measures to protect minorities 
with a positive long-term effect on their integration.  Today, it is clear that 
the agreement has fulfilled the primary purpose – to establish peace and 
13 Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria) - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_
copenhague.html 
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to end the violent conflict. By providing inclusive institutional procedures, 
it has offered basis for development of human rights and transformation 
of conflict.
However, there are three debatable aspects in terms of the procedural 
complexities in the Agreement and its formal endurance. Firstly, a political 
agreement written in English was used to amend a constitution adopted 
in Macedonian, creating serious implementation deficiencies. Secondly, 
the Agreement forced popularly elected representatives in the Assembly 
to vote according to the decisions of the signatories. Thirdly, OFA implicitly 
established a leeway for armed groups in the future to pressure for 
constitutional rearrangement.
Ohrid Agreement’s only authentic version is the one written in American 
English14. In that sense, when drafting the provisions, peace negotiators 
did not fully take into account the differences between legal terms in 
the continental and common law systems. In accordance with the 1991 
Constitution, the Ohrid Agreement had to be drafted and adopted in 
Macedonian, as the only official language in the country. Additionally, 
the implementation reforms were complicated because the English 
version was the only agreed basis for interpretation of the provisions and 
the “spirit” of the agreement. As a result, there have been dilemmas 
emerging from the differentiation in the meaning of legal terms used in the 
Agreement. For instance, there was a dispute on the term ‘community’ 
because in Macedonian, its meaning is imprecise both conceptually 
and contextually. The dilemmas were if the term was to represent a local 
community or an ethnic one. “If it refers to an ethnic community, it is not 
clear whether it includes the Macedonian ethnic community or only 
national minorities”. (Skaric 2004: 96) Moreover, phrases such as ‘public 
body’ or ‘public institution’ have an unspecified meaning. In Macedonia, 
there are numerous institutions that have public character, including: 
public enterprises, government agencies, agencies of the local self-
government, partnerships etc. However, none of them are differentiated 
into categories used in the agreement. As it will be discussed later, the 
Agreement was insistent on the principle of equal representation of 
communities on all levels in the public life. Yet, with the impreciseness in 
the wording, it became unclear what are the areas that the term ‘public 
14 Paragraph 10.2., Ohrid Framework Agreement.
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life’ encompasses. In practice, these formal anomalies were a burden 
to a substantial implementation. Specifically, the anomalies came into 
practice with the aforementioned Law on the use of language spoken 
by 20% of the population, where the use of the Albanian language is 
extended to all public areas. Those public areas are numbered in the 
law, but the scope of the usage remained unclear. There is a continued 
debate if the areas would include private companies which affect public 
sectors, private cultural and health facilities, private universities, etc. Such 
ambiguity demonstrates that the legal terminology used in the Agreement 
poses an obstacle to the meaningful implementation.
Another procedural implication is that the provisions of the Agreement 
forced popularly elected representatives in the Assembly to vote according 
to the decisions of its signatories, thereby creating an unconstitutional 
process of constitution amending. The Constitution in Article 61 stipulates 
that “The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia is a representative 
body of the citizens and the legislative power of the Republic is vested 
in it.” More importantly, Article 62 states that “the Representative [in the 
Assembly] represents the citizens and makes decisions in the Assembly 
in accordance with his/her personal convictions.” Finally, according 
to Article 68, line 1 and 2, the Assembly is the only constitutional body 
that is responsible for adopting and changing the constitution, as well 
as adopting laws and giving an authentic interpretation of laws. OFA 
disrupted this concept because it proposed changes of the constitution 
circumventing the Assembly. The signatories agreed on the exact 
provisions that would be incorporated in the Constitution, stipulated in 
Annex A and B of OFA. This meant that the representatives had to discuss 
and amend the constitution, as stated in the Agreement. According to 
Paragraph 8.1:
“The constitutional amendments attached at Annex A will be presented 
to the Assembly immediately. The parties will take all measures to assure 
adoption of these amendments within 45 days of signature of this 
Framework Agreement.”
These provisions represented an obligation for the signatories to pressure 
their peers in the Assembly in order to assure an adoption of the 
amendments, flagrantly violating Article 62 of the constitution. This meant 
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that a political agreement dominated over the only constitutional body 
that directly represents the citizens of the country. Without questioning the 
attitude of the representatives towards the constitutional amendments, 
the fact that a political decision was made on a “higher” level, constrained 
the free decision of the popularly elected representatives. This top-down 
approach did not allow for an inclusive and legal process of constitution 
amending. In the rush to appease the conflicting sides, the drafters did 
not allow the elected parliamentary representatives to have a say in 
the process. The approach also excluded civil society activists, university 
professors, practitioners and experts. The lack of public debate led to 
uninformed choices on the new constitutional design, affecting both the 
quality of the text and the legality of the procedure. Authors argue that 
“Informed choices are particularly vital in these contexts where peace is 
fragile, populations are sharply divided, leaders tend to be inexperienced 
in governance, and traditional checks and balances are likely to be very 
weak” (Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth 2006). Essentially, exclusion from 
the drafting process later led to lack of ownership in the implementation 
phase. Conversely, if there was a phased process envisioned, in which the 
prime goal would be the secession of violence followed by a prolonged 
and inclusive debate on the constitutional arrangement, it would have 
allowed for an all-encompassing constitutional amending procedure. 
Such process would have guaranteed peace and would have increased 
the quality of the amendments. Moreover, the inclusion of an aggregate of 
actors in a fruitful public debate would have led to meaningful participation 
of all in the implementation phase.As a third procedural implication, OFA 
implicitly established leeway for armed groups in the future to pressure 
for constitutional rearrangements. While the Constitution provided a 
transparent and inclusive amending procedure, OFA tacitly legitimized 
the use of violence as a way of pressuring the parliament to engage in 
constitution remaking. Instead of pursuing constitutional transformation 
through institutionalization of the conflict, the agreement, by honoring 
rebels’ demands, allowed proposals reached with violence to be put into 
constitutional amendments. This set forth a negative example, using which 
future rebels and/or terrorists could demand systemic political changes. 
“The problem appears when it is assessed that the conflict is cost-effective 
so the nationalist requests are enhanced”. (Vasović 2003: 43) In that sense, 
this critical implication poses a dilemma: Can amendments achieved 
through violence legitimize the use of force by radical groups for fulfillment 
of their political agendas?  The dilemma was soon put into practice with 
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the platforms used by outlaws from the former KLA and NLA during the 
outbursts of violence in the following years. For example, in the clash with 
the security forces in Kumanovo in 2015 the terrorists pledged fighting “for 
the issue of the disintegration of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the 
alleged discrimination against Albanians in Macedonia15.” The fact that 
violence should never be accepted as an instrument for democratization 
is undermined by the Agreement’s unconditional admirers. The political 
support for groups who use violence to change the political system has 
shown to be costly, both politically and with regards to human lives and 
infrastructural destruction. The alternative to the swift top-down approach 
which includes armed groups’ demands, would entail preemptive power-
sharing solutions and secession of violence. Such agreements would be 
followed by phased democratic changes, strengthened by revoking of 
the political support to armed radicals by all societal actors.
In substantial sense, the agreement, in its goals and provisions, 
overestimated the ability of the Macedonian society to absorb the all-
encompassing solutions. The set goals went beyond stopping and de-
escalation of the violence. They also entailed securing the democratic 
future, development of closer and integrated relations with Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, peaceful and harmonious development of the civil society 
and respect for ethnic identity and the interests of all. Apart from the goals 
which were discussed in the previous section, some of OFA’s provisions also 
caused practical problems in their implementation. Here, we analyze the 
implication of the aspects such as the selection of public administration 
and the paradigm of the “spirit” of the Agreement. 
Domestic and international actors pushed for expedited implementation 
of the principle for equitable representation of minorities on all levels of 
the public administration. Such implementation has demonstrated the 
unpreparedness of the Macedonian society to “absorb” the Agreement. 
Orlovic asserts that “Proportional representation, although essentially 
good, through allocation of quotas doubles the administrative posts and 
public expenditures”. (Orlovic 2015) The Agreement itself, in Annex C, 
regulated the process of employment of the minority communities, stating 
that “[a]s initial steps […] the parties [are] committed to ensuring that 500 
15 One of the leaders of the group – Commander Malisheva – wrote a letter from the prison in Stip explaining the purpose 
of their entrance to Kumanovo and the organized clash against the Macedonian security forces. More on the issue in 
Macedonian see at http://bit.ly/2qX4LPn
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new police officers from communities not in the majority in the population 
of Macedonia would be hired and trained by July 2002, and 500 additional 
such officers will be hired and trained by July 2003”. Since the Agreement, 
minority communities’ representation has been increased on all levels of 
the public administration, but the full demands have not been met. Authors 
argue that the trend of “inclusion of Albanians in the public institutions will 
have to be continued, because of the imbalance between the number 
of the employed and the number of persons belonging to the Albanian 
community in Macedonia”. (Skaric 2004: 104) However, the employment 
on ethnic basis contradicts the criterion for professionalization of the public 
administration, set in the platform for EU integration. Authors comment 
that jobs in public institutions have been awarded to party loyalists on 
both sides, replacing more qualified professionals. “Hiring Albanians also 
risks becoming a “box ticking exercise” in which many new employees 
have no clearly defined job description, office or equipment” (CGE 
Report 2011: N°212). 
According to the Ministry of Administration, on 31 December 2016, 129,653 
people were working in one of the 1,291 public institutions in Macedonia 
(Yearly Report on the employed in the public sector 2017: 28). With more 
than 6% of the population employed in the public administration, there 
is a clear lack of capacity of the administration to perform its primary 
function – to serve the citizens. This implication demonstrates that the 
Agreement can only be absorbed if the society enters an effective 
process of modernization. The circulus vitiosus can be broken only by 
solid economic progress, driven by professionalization of the workforce. 
Such progress would be driven by the innovative measures in the private 
sector, which should remain the primary employer. Therefore, it is essential 
for OFA to inspire this trend, not to be its counterpart.
Regarding the “spirit” of the Agreement, there have been two contesting 
approaches. On one side, a more legalistic approach interprets 
agreement’s provisions as they are written in the text, without deriving 
mantras and guiding motives. On the other side, there is a broader 
approach, which reads the agreement through the lenses of a socio-
political context. This politicization of the provisions and their broad 
interpretation as a source of constitutional law, further drives the ethnic 
polarization in the society. There are two most evident examples. First, in 
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the last presidential elections, the ruling political party from the Albanian 
block asked for a concept of consensual election of the president of the 
country, in line with, according to them, the spirit of consensual democracy 
envisioned in OFA. Until now, the president is elected on direct popular 
elections with the majority of votes of all citizens, as regulated by the 
constitution. The party ,DUI, stated that it would not legitimize the elected 
president because of the lack of votes from the Albanian community. 
Meeting their demands for consensual election would require new 
amendments to the constitution, something that was not agreed in OFA. 
Second example of such extension of OFA’s spirit was evident early in 
2017, when Albanian leaders from Macedonia signed the so called “Tirana 
Platform”, based on the spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement16. Under 
the auspices of the Albanian prime minister, the signatories pledged for 
a bi-national reengineering of the constitution. The redesigning would 
be accompanied with the use of the Albanian language as an official 
constitutional language, including its use in the army, on state emblems, 
its international use Finally, changes were demanded in the public 
finances regarding municipalities, affirmative measures for financing 
Albanians in the cultural institutions, creation of central institutions for 
the promotion of the Albanian language etc. This type of extending the 
“spirit” of the agreement to all forms of elections and decision-making 
complicates the Macedonian political future. In essence, insisting on the 
autonomous power of the Agreement and its superordinate position over 
the constitution, undermines the principle of rule of law. On the other 
hand, the rule of law represents a principle without which there can be 
no meaningful democratization of the political system and the society in 
general.
Rights based solely on ethnic belonging further drive the polarization 
of the people on ethnic lines. This threatens severe division within the 
society. Some state that the concept “[is] rather divergence and 
separation than integration” (Orlovic 2015). This divergence starts from 
elementary schools, affects the secondary education, and peaks on 
universities. The strict implementation of mother-tongue education 
principle in separate schools, divides cities and communities. Albanians 
study in their own elementary schools, graduate from universities where 
teaching is exclusively in Albanian, which significantly decreases the 
16 The full text of the “Tirana Platform” can be found at http://netpress.com.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1AB.jpg
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communication with Macedonian peers, friends and neighbors. This 
mono-ethnic educational approach hinders social cohesion from early 
age, and decreases the personal contact. Some argue that “in many 
cases, the formal organization of power along identity or ethnic lines 
seems to entrench the divisions that fueled the conflict, rather than 
ameliorate them, and divisions appear to become radicalized during the 
power-sharing phase” (Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth, 2006). Essentially, 
what Macedonia needs is an inclusive concept for all the citizens, which 
accepts and promotes different nationalities. The resolution of the conflict 
would go beyond the creation of a nation-free or bi-national state, and 
demand for multiethnicization of politics and policy making on all levels. 
The simplest solution to separate the “hostile” ethnic groups that 
guarantees a “negative” peace (based on “ethnicization” of politics and 
ghettoization of citizens from different ethnic backgrounds), according 
to some scholars, is a quick, but not a qualitatively satisfying solution 
(Vankovska 2014). Therefore, the Agreement aimed but failed to target 
all the roots causes of the conflict, such as the structural injustice and 
violence which were present in the societal context in the 1990s. Instead, 
it promoted the belief that a constitutional re-arrangement by itself would 
automatically eliminate the conflict in Macedonia. On the contrary, the 
expansion of its spirit way beyond the aspirations of peace agreements 
coupled with all-encompassing goals of development and international 
integration, protracted as well as hindered its implementation.
Going forward – 17 years after Ohrid
This year marks the 17th anniversary of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. 
That allows for scholars and practitioners to evaluate Agreement’s medium-
term outcomes. As it has been analyzed in the article, the implications 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement transplanted into Constitutional 
amendments are complex and multi-pronged. These amendments 
initiated multivalent and diverse processes, which were contextualized by 
the particularities of the Macedonian society and political considerations. 
Even though those processes make devising a generalized conclusion 
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difficult, the ex post facto analysis allows for some lessons to be drawn for 
future post-conflict constitutional redesigning.
Today, the Ohrid Agreement is one of the pillars of the Macedonian 
multiethnic social reality. All major political parties’ platforms entail the goal 
for Macedonia to become an integral part of the European Union and 
NATO. In this sense, the Agreement represents a criterion for success of the 
reforms and a protector of minorities’ rights. However, the Agreement has 
intrinsic flaws which hinder the process of its own implementation. As has 
been analyzed, the Agreement cannot be fully absorbed in the political 
system, neither by the criterion of its goals, nor by its over-reaching spirit 
which allows for free interpretation by political actors.
Several implications should be taken into consideration. First, in 
procedural sense, foreign terminology of agreements creates difficulties 
in the implementation of the provisions into the domestic legal system. 
Therefore, the language in peace agreements that entail constitutional 
redesigning should reflect the legalistic practice from the original 
constitutional framework. This can be done swiftly if the process includes 
local experts who would consult the process, adding value to the final 
draft.  Even more, a direct transplantation of agreement’s provisions into 
constitutional amendments undermines some procedural principles, such 
as, the independence of elected representatives, their right to vote and 
the process of law adoption. As was discussed in the article, agreements 
could, implicitly, institute a new harmful constitution amending procedure, 
through force and external pressure, contrary to the accepted principles 
of modern democracies. In that sense, agreements which purpose is 
to bring about developmental change, should not infringe established 
liberal principles. Peace agreements should set the stage for a process 
of institutionalized constitution redesigning, and serve as a driver for 
development of reforms and progressive democratic principles. Therefore, 
peace agreements should follow a phased approach, in which there will 
be steps for averting violence, institutionalizing conflict resolution, and 
forging a forum for constitutional redesigning. 
Second, constitutional-institutional engineers should set the goals of the 
peace agreement realistically. If the approach of the peace process is 
mono-dimensional – stopping escalation and freezing violence – then 
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internationally drafted agreements would suffice. However, if the goals 
include democratic development, internal and international integration, 
promotion of civil society and protection of minorities, peace agreements 
should take into consideration the intangible issues of political folklore, 
emotional tensions and historical imprints. Thus, if the social context 
is misunderstood or neglected in the post-conflict design, it can put 
ethnic lenses to its reading and implementation. That could load the 
implementation with emotions, prejudices, fear and stigma. For some 
authors, this happens because “…interests of implementers and evaluators 
are superficial and temporary, whereas the problems are long-lasting” 
(Orlovic 2015). Therefore, it is important for the agreement to entail realistic 
view of the capabilities of the affected society to substantially implement 
the provisions that have been negotiated. Then, the process of drafting 
and implementation of the agreement should include international 
actors, but also local scholars, experts, interest groups and societal 
stakeholders. In that manner, the process would allow for ownership both 
for the text of the agreement and for its implementation. The success 
of the arrangement can then be assessed by the ability of the societal 
actors to legally, politically and developmentally adhere to its provisions. 
Third, if an agreement entails goals that go beyond achieving peace, 
then it should provide opportunities for conflict transformation – institutional 
mechanisms that transform the violent conflict into a developmental one. 
A constitutional reform cannot be successful if it does not set a base for 
dealing with the immediate triggers of the conflict and acute symptoms. 
In that sense, agreements should provide avenues for functional and 
structural power sharing, not a declarative power divide. The simplistic 
approach to separate and isolate the powers between conflicting parties 
leads to divergence. The gap that would be created leads to creating a 
society of bare tolerance, not of acceptance of the differences. In that 
sense, mediators’ prowess would come to light if agreements are designed 
to target the conflict root causes and envision their management. 
Authors claim that a pure consociational or integrative approach cannot 
be implemented in practice, and pose dangers to multiethnic societies 
(Norris 2005, Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth 2006). Even systems that heavily 
relied on one or the other approach have failed significantly. Lack of 
success can be seen in the examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Lebanon which relied heavily on Lijphard’s consociationalism, or Uganda 
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and Fiji, which models were largely based on the integrative approach. 
Therefore, the answer in designing post-conflict constitutional systems 
should ask for meaningful power sharing, one that includes avenues 
for cooperation between the sides. Consociational models would set 
the basis for power sharing between the conflicting groups. In addition, 
the integrative governance would surpass the differences between the 
groups, by promoting cooperation in achieving the common goals. Those 
avenues would be the added value to the system that would lead to 
developmental changes. In essence, they should include full acceptance 
and promotion of ethnic diversity, extensive use of all languages, the 
creation of joint educational programs focusing on multiculturalism and 
inclusion of all minorities in the societal system.
The purpose of multiethnic societies is to promote and protect diversity, 
not to create separate and parallel systems. The answer to the question of 
conflict does not entail ethnically neutral approach. It lies in the creation of 
a multi-ethnical system where ethnicities’ rights are respected, promoted 
and protected.  The multiethnicism in Macedonian should act as its 
insignia, an example for the broader region and for future generations. 
That can be achieved if the Ohrid Framework Agreement is seen as a 
driver for the creation of a functioning multiethnic society oriented towards 
development and innovation, which respects the languages, the symbols, 
and the cultural heritage of all its members. Finally, the legal framework 
should assist the building of a societal system in which all ethnicities would 
sense their belonging and build their future.
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